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We can be grateful for such a book that tackles these difficult issues 
head-on and for its encouragement to probe these matters more thor-
oughly in the context of interdisciplinary dialogue.
Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument, by J. P. Moreland. 
New York, 2008. 244 pages. $133 (hardcover).
ULRICH SCHMIDT, Academy for Philosophy, Munich
In his book Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument, J. P. 
Moreland argues that the existence of conscious beings in the universe 
is evidence for the existence of God. In the first chapter, Moreland ad-
dresses naturalism, the main rival world-view opposed to theism. Strong 
naturalism is the view that all particulars, all properties, all relations, and 
all laws in the universe are physical. And there are no entities like mental 
properties, souls, angels or God inside or outside of the universe. The 
spatio-temporal universe (or universes) postulated by current science is 
all there is (8–9). By contrast, weak naturalism softens the definition of 
strong naturalism and accepts forms of emergent mental properties (ix, 
8–9). Naturalism is committed to telling a “Grand Story,” a causal story 
of how all things there are now in the universe came to be. This story 
will include the Big Bang, the development of organic matter out of inor-
ganic structures, the evolution of complex organisms and the emergence 
of consciousness (6–8). The ontology of a naturalist will be a physicalist 
ontology, and existence will be defined as belonging to the causal space-
time system of our universe (8–10). If we accept naturalism, then we must 
either reduce consciousness to physical states (reductive physicalism) 
or deny that consciousness exists (eliminative physicalism). Naturalism 
faces the location problem: Naturalists allow only physical entities to 
exist. So they have the problem of what to do with entities like semantic 
content, mind, consciousness, qualia, and agency. Where should they be 
located? The naturalist faces the tough task of locating them somewhere 
in the mereological hierarchy which naturalists usually accept.
In naturalism, the ground level of the hierarchy consists of elementary 
particles. At higher levels there are sub-atomic parts, atoms, molecules, 
cells and living organisms. These entities are constituted by the elementary 
particles. Their properties and their behavior can be entirely explained in 
terms of the properties and behavior of the elementary particles. They 
can be reduced to the elementary particles. The relation between indi-
viduals at level n and individuals at level n + 1 is the part-whole-relation. 
Cells are parts of living organisms. Molecules are parts of cells. Atoms 
are parts of molecules. Sub-atomic parts like protons and neutrons are 
parts of atoms. Elementary particles like up-quarks and down-quarks are 
parts of sub-atomic parts (10–15). An emergent property is a unique new 
118 Faith and Philosophy
kind of property different from the properties at the subvenient base level 
of the emergent property. For example, the feeling of pain is new and 
different from all the chemical properties of the underlying brain state 
(15). A structural property is a property that is constituted by the parts, 
properties, relations and events at the subvenient level. It is not a new 
kind of property. Rather it is a new configuration of the entities at the sub-
venient level. A structural property is necessarily caused by the properties 
at the lower level. A structural property can be causally and ontologically 
reduced to the properties at the lower level (15). The mass of a stone is 
an example of a structural property. It can be reduced to the sum of the 
masses of the elementary particles the stone consists of. Structural prop-
erties can easily be located in the naturalistic mereological hierarchy. By 
contrast, emergent properties like conscious qualia cannot. This is so 
because the naturalist wants to keep the causal closure of the physical 
domain. But it is obvious to us from introspection that mental states, by 
force of their qualia, are causal factors in our behavior. Joy causes us to 
smile. Pain causes us to sigh (16–18).
In chapter 2, Moreland presents the Knowledge Argument for the con-
clusion that conscious properties are mental properties and not physical 
properties (39–45). Mary is a neuroscientist. She knows everything scien-
tific there is to know about perception. But she has been in a black-and-
white room all her life. She has always lacked the experience of seeing a 
color. She does not know what it is like to see a red apple. Assume that she 
now leaves her black-and-white room. Then she learns something new. 
She acquires knowledge by acquaintance. She learns what it is like to see 
a red apple. Therefore, mental properties are not physical properties. For 
Mary knew all physical properties there are about perception. But she still 
did not know all the properties that are involved in perception. She did not 
know the mental property what it is like to see a red object. Since property 
dualism is true, the naturalist cannot hold her view by being an eliminative 
physicalist. Thus only the option of reductive physicalism remains. Can 
physicalism and naturalism explain the existence of consciousness? The 
Knowledge Argument moves from the fact that physical properties do not 
exhaust all properties involved in perception to the conclusion that there 
are non-physical mental properties. Here is another line of argument for 
the same conclusion: Physical properties have entirely different character-
istics (spatially extended, measurable, observable, many are composed of 
parts) than mental properties (non-spatial, not observable by perception, 
privileged private access by introspection, simple entities). Therefore, by 
Leibniz’s Law of the Identity of Indiscernible Entities, physical properties 
are not identical with mental properties. Moreland presents the Theistic 
Argument from Consciousness as an inference to the best explanation 
(32), as a Bayesian argument (32–37), and as a deductive argument (37–51). 
The main line of thinking is this:
(1) The existence of conscious beings in the universe cannot be ex-
plained by naturalism. (Premise 1)
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(2) The existence of conscious beings in the universe can be explained 
by theism. (Premise 2)
(3) Therefore, conscious beings in the universe are evidence for theism 
and no evidence for naturalism. (conclusion)
Premise 1 is true because the existence of conscious beings in the universe 
is not natural, but rather ad hoc for naturalism (29–30). Consciousness is 
not natural for naturalism, because it does not bear relevant similarity to 
the core entities of naturalism which are the elementary particles, the four 
fundamental forces and the initial parameters of the universe. It is ad hoc, 
because consciousness is not at home in naturalism, but it is at home in 
the rival world view theism. For theists, the fundamental entity, God, is a 
conscious being. So consciousness is a property at the fundamental level 
of reality. Premise 2 is true because the fundamental assumption of theism 
is that God exists and is a conscious being. He can create a universe with 
conscious beings in it and it is reasonable to assume that God so wills. The 
conclusion follows by the principle of theory confirmation. If a theory can 
explain the existence of x, then the existence of x is evidence for the theory. 
And if there is some x, then it confirms a theory, if the theory can explain 
the existence of x.
In chapters 3–7, Moreland shows in detail why the views opposed to 
theistic dualism cannot explain the existence of consciousness. Moreland 
criticizes three naturalistic approaches, panpsychism, and pluralistic 
emergentist monism. John Searle claims all the naturalist needs to do 
in order to explain consciousness is to provide contingent correlations 
between mental and physical states (53). In contrast, Moreland claims 
with Thomas Nagel that a contingent explanation of consciousness is not 
enough (58). Contingent correlations do not explain why mental proper-
ties emerge in organisms. The hard problem of consciousness is not why 
physical states are correlated with mental states, but why mental proper-
ties emerge at all. It could have been the case that organisms are not con-
scious. According to the Grand Story of the naturalist several billion years 
passed after the Big Bang without a conscious being in the universe. Why 
did consciousness emerge? Physics, chemistry, biology and neurology in 
principle cannot explain that, because their explanations only involve the 
pushing and pulling between atoms, molecules and neurons. The nature 
of consciousness is different from that.
Timothy O’Connor argues that the naturalist must explain why physi-
cal states necessarily cause mental states. Moreland agrees with this. 
O’Connor defends the view that agent causation can be accepted by the 
naturalist. Moreland disagrees with this (70–71). Agent causation is incon-
sistent with or at least difficult to harmonize with naturalism. This is so, 
because the only causation known in physics is the passive liabilities of 
physical objects. By contrast, we know by introspection that agent causa-
tion is an uncaused activity performed by an agent with intentions and 
reasons.
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Colin McGinn claims that all naturalist attempts to explain the mental fail 
for in-principle reasons. McGinn offers a mysterian naturalist solution to the 
phenomenon of consciousness (95–98). He claims that there is no knowable 
solution to the origin of consciousness and the correlations between mental 
and physical entities. McGinn is a property dualist and rejects naturalistic 
accounts of consciousness. For they cannot fulfill the necessitation require-
ment of providing an explanation why necessarily mental entities had to 
emerge. According to McGinn, a solution to the problem of consciousness 
would imply the existence of three properties: (i) There must be some prop-
erties of matter that produce consciousness. (ii) There must be properties of 
the brain that unleash the properties of (i). (iii) Consciousness must have a 
hidden essence (98). Moreland criticizes McGinn mainly for two reasons. 
First, McGinn does not solve the problem of consciousness. McGinn only 
relocates the problem of consciousness into his three postulated properties 
(110). Second, it is not clear that McGinn’s view is a version of naturalism. 
McGinn’s three postulated properties cannot be known empirically. Nor are 
they similar to the rest of the naturalist’s ontology. Hence it is vacuous to 
call these properties “naturalistic” (109–110).
David Skrbina advocates a version of panpsychism, according to which 
every object has singular and unified experiences for itself and every sys-
tem of mass/energy counts as such an object. The universe as a whole has 
a mind, a world-soul (116–117). Moreland shows that some of Skrbina’s 
arguments for panpsychism in fact favor theistic dualism over panpsy-
chism and naturalism. This is so with the Argument from Design. The 
assumption of a designer outside of the physical objects can explain the 
internal structure of physical objects better than the assumption of mental 
properties inside the physical objects. For it is easier for a mind outside of 
a structure to give it law-like behavior, beauty and complexity than it is 
for many minds inside the physical objects (125–126). Beyond that, Mo-
reland argues against panpsychism. In the Argument from Inconclusive 
Analogy, Moreland argues that the analogy between human beings and 
other objects is groundless. Therefore, panpsychism is groundless (127). 
In the No Signs Objection, Moreland argues that panpsychism predicts no 
empirical facts. Therefore, panpsychism cannot be tested and cannot be 
confirmed (127–128).
The final view Moreland addresses is Philip Clayton’s view of pluralis-
tic emergentist monism. Clayton’s view is a form of monism, since Clayton 
claims that reality is one stuff. But Clayton’s view is not a form of physical-
ism, since Clayton claims that physics is not enough to describe reality. 
According to Clayton, many emergent properties—emergent physical, 
chemical, neurological, biological, mental properties and so on—have 
arisen out of physical entities during evolution. The emergence of con-
sciousness is no special case of emergence. Clayton rejects naturalism in 
favor of theistic dualism, because naturalism cannot answer why there is 
anything at all, why there are ethical obligations, why there are religious 
experiences and why human beings long for purpose and meaning in life. 
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So Clayton’s view is a theistic view like Moreland’s (135–139). Moreland 
argues that theistic dualism should be favored over Clayton’s theistic plu-
ralistic emergentist monism. One should not practice a shopping-list ap-
proach to metaphysics as Clayton does (140). Rather, one should reduce 
all emergent physical, chemical, neurological, and biological properties to 
the fundamental physical entities. These entities can be reduced, because 
they in fact are structural properties and not emergent properties. But 
mental entities cannot be reduced, because of their new kind of properties 
and their new causal powers. Thus Moreland advocates theistic dualism.
In the chapters 3–7, Moreland has argued that property dualism is su-
perior to the other explanations of consciousness. In chapter 8, Moreland 
deals with the main objection to property dualism. It is the claim that dual-
ism is anti-scientific. Moreland is convinced of the autonomy of philosophy 
(159–160). He assumes the central questions of philosophy and philosophy 
of mind can be answered only by philosophical reasoning, investigation 
and argument. The answers to these questions do not rely on science. The 
central questions of philosophy are autonomous with respect to science, 
because they are to a great extent unrelated to the hard sciences.
If a philosophical question is autonomous with respect to the hard 
sciences, it must be evaluated from case to case. The hard sciences have 
“almost no bearing on the nature of consciousness” (157). This is so, be-
cause even if we have evidence of the dependence of mental faculties on 
the brain, this is not sufficient reason to attribute these mental faculties to 
the brain rather than the soul. It is not natural to attribute mental facul-
ties to the brain, because all the other properties of brains we know—for 
example, by neuroscience—are very different from mental faculties. Cor-
relations between mental and physical properties are the most the hard sci-
ences can deliver on the topic of consciousness. Even if we have evidence of 
many correlations between mental and physical properties, this leaves the 
philosophical possibilities open. Mental and physical properties could be 
identical, mental properties could cause physical properties or vice versa or 
in both directions. Mental properties could supervene on physical proper-
ties or vice versa. Or there could be no causal relations and no dependence 
relations between mental and physical properties, but just parallelism. 
Therefore, in spite of the progress of biology, neuroscience and cognitive 
science, the nature of conscious human beings is a philosophical question. 
So property dualism is superior to alternative views of consciousness. This 
is step 1 of the Theistic Argument from Consciousness (156):
(1) The existence of consciousness is best explained by property dualism.
(2) Property dualism is best explained by theism.
Step 2 of the argument is this: We now assume that mental properties 
exist. They are new kinds of properties compared to physical properties 
and they exhibit new causal powers. Mental states cannot emerge from 
physical states. For what is possible during evolution is only that new 
physicalstructures emerge by rearrangement of the physical elementary 
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particles. But one cannot see how properties of an entirely novel kind can 
emerge. If we assume theism, by contrast, then God as the conscious fun-
damental being can have created the finite mental entities in the universe.
In chapter 9 Moreland addresses the question why so many philoso-
phers are physicalists in spite of the lack of evidence for physicalism. 
Moreland assumes that it is not rational arguments that drive many phi-
losophers towards physicalism and naturalism. Rather, it is the climate 
in universities and it is fear of God (176–177). But from the perspective of 
Christian Theism, since God is merciful and benevolent, we do not have 
to fear God. Rather, since only God gives us forgiveness and eternal life as 
a gift, the only thing we have to fear is losing our relationship with God 
(Matthew 10:28–31).
J. P. Moreland’s book is a must-read for everyone interested in theis-
tic arguments. It is also a valuable source of information about different 
views in the philosophy of mind. In my view, Moreland has made a very 
strong and convincing case for the existence of God based on the exis-
tence of finite consciousness. He has presented and criticized five different 
views on the mind-body relation in detail. The failure of these views and 
the Knowledge Argument, which Moreland presents with brilliant clarity, 
show why at least property dualism is the best view to accept. Property 
dualism in turn is much better explained by theism than by naturalism. 
There are two ways in which Moreland’s project could be expanded. First, 
one could present even more views on the mind-body relation and show 
that they are inferior to property dualism. Second, one could present more 
positive reasons besides the Knowledge Argument for the conclusion 
that mind-body dualism is true—for example, the Zombie Arguments by 
David Chalmers or the arguments by Alvin Plantinga in “Against Materi-
alism.” Overall, Moreland’s Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theis-
tic Argument is the best publication available on the relation between God 
and finite conscious beings.
